Seton Hall University

eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship

Seton Hall Law

5-1-2013

Bringing Cultural Genocide in by the Backdoor:
Victim Participation at the ICC
Kristina Marie Hon

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Recommended Citation
Hon, Kristina Marie, "Bringing Cultural Genocide in by the Backdoor: Victim Participation at the ICC" (2013). Law School Student
Scholarship. 352.
https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/352

BRINGING CULTURAL GENOCIDE IN BY THE BACKDOOR:
VICTIM PARTICIPATION AT THE ICC
Kristina Hon*

I.

Introduction

Cultural genocide is the much-maligned and oft-forgotten companion of the simplytermed concept of "genocide." Unlike genocide-a word used to characterize horrors such as
the killings in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and, controversially, Darfur-cultural genocide
does not require the killing of a single person. 1 In fact, no physical harm need ever befall a
victim of cultural genocide? That is because cultural genocide3 strips from humanity all manner
of cultural contributions by human groups, through the destruction of those artifacts, documents,
books, monuments, or even languages that embody the group's identity.4 More simply, it is
nothing more or less than the total destruction of a culture so as to obliterate the identity of a

*J.D. and M.A. Candidate, 2013, Seton Hall University School of Law and Whitehead School of Diplomacy and
International Relations; B.A., summa cum laude, 2009, George Washington University.
1
Daphne Anayiotos, The Cultural Genocide Debate: Should the UN Genocide Convention Include a Provision on
Cultural Genocide or Should the Phenomenon be Encompassed in a Separate International Treaty?, 22 N.Y.lNT'L
L. REv. 99, 100 (2009).
2

3
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Scholars have used various other terms to descnoe the concept of cultural genocide. "Ethnocide" is the most
frequent one; it was originally coined by Raphael Lemkin (who also coined "genocide") who considered it to be
interchangeable with "genocide." RAPHAEL LEMK.IN, Axis RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE 79 (1944) ("Another term
could be used for the same idea, namely, ethnocide, consisting of the Greek word "ethnos"-nation--and the Latin
word "cide."). However, since then, it has been interpreted to mean "the [systematic] destruction of a culture
without the killing of its bearers," which is more along the lines of the contemporary defmition of cultural genocide.
Lorie M. Graham, Reparations, Self-Determination, and the Seventh Generation, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. 1. 47,67
(2008) (quoting FRANK CHALK & KURT JONASSOHN, THE HISTORY AND SOCIOLOGY OF GENOCIDE: ANALYSES AND
CASE STUDIES 8-10 (1990)). This concept has also been directly, as well as indirectly, expressed in international
documents. See, e.g., UNESCO Declaration of San Jose (Unesco and the struggle against ethnocide), U.N.E.S.C.O.
Doc.FS 82/WF32 (Dec. 11, 1981) ("Ethnocide means that an ethnic group is denied the right to enjoy, develop and
transmit its own culture and its own language, whether collectively or individually."). This tautological distinction
bas no bearing on this Comment or relevant legal analysis.
4
G.A. Res. 96(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/96(1) (Dec. 11, 1946); U.N. Secretariat, First Draft ofthe Genocide
------tC~9'1'li'l'\~'emn#en, U.N. DeG. E/447 (May J:.~~www.preYeffigeaeeide.erW!a>•'niGain'efttiea/dro."'ts/.
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people. 5 As such, a culture and identity can be destroyed "even if all the members of the group
[are] still alive. " 6
It is, of course, an extraordinarily rare occurrence that cultural genocide happens on its

own, without any kind of physical abuse simultaneously i.t1flicted on the victims.7 More often
than not, cultural genocide is wrapped up in, and overshadowed by, physical violence. 8 A prime
example of this is occurring today, in Darfur, Sudan. 9

The forcible displacement and

annihilation of villages and communal societies is wrenching the three primarily-targeted tribes
from their land, their communities, and their cultural base. 10 The Government of Sudan forces,
in conjunction with the Janjaweed militia, have pursued a ruthless policy of "killings, rapes,
[and] burning of villages . . . against non-Arab villagers" in "multiple attacks over a prolonged
period of time [resulting in the destruction of the villages] by burning, shelling or bombing,
making it impossible for the villagers to return to their villages." 11 The Arab versus non-Arab
tension fueling the conflict-and generally underpinning the government's "Arab-Islamic
supremacist and demonizing policies"-has materialized in the violent struggle for the
"incentives" of "[t]he property, possessions, livestock, and the cultivated land itself' of the nonArabs living in Darfur. 12

5

Anayiostos, supra note 1, at 100.
Id at 102 (emphasis omitted).
7
See, e.g., Anayiostos, supra note 1 (discussion on Nazi German policies).
8 Id
9
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DARFUR DESTROYED: ETHNIC CLEANSING BY GOVERNMENT AND MILITIA FORCES IN
WESTERN SUDAN 5 VOL. 16:6(A) (May 2004) [hereinafter Darfur Destroyed].
10
Micol Sirkin, Comment, Expanding the Crime of Genocide to Include Ethnic Cleansing: A Return to Established
Principles in Light of Contemporary Interpretations, 33 SEATTLE UNN. L. R. 489, 516-17 (20 10).
11
The Crisis in Darfur: Hearing Before the Sen. Foreign Relations Comm., 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Colin
L. Powell, Sec'y of State) available at http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-a-2004-09-09-8-Text.html.
12
JOHN HAGAN AND WENONA RYMOND-RlCHl'v:lOND, DARFUR AND THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE 5 (2009).
6
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Darfur, while the most recent illustration of genocide, is but one in a succession. The
term 'genocide' was coined in 1943 by a Polish law professor, Raphael Lemkin, 13 as a
combination of the Greek word 'genos' or 'genus' meaning race, and the Latin word 'cide'
meaning killing (as in homicide or fratricide). 14 He used it to describe the Armenian decimation
by the Turks during World War I, but the concept became fmnly embedded in legal and political
terminology when he applied it to the German Nazis' policies to exterminate the Jews and the
Roma throughout Europe during World War II. 15 Lemkin's definition of genocide was a very
broad and holistic one, and reflective of the wide variety of destructive measures employed by
the Nazis, encompassing the "disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture,
language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups, and the
destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals
belonging to such groups." 16 For Lemkin, the destruction of the lives of the victims seemed
almost an afterthought, as if taking their lives was, while cruel, a mercy in comparison to the
annihilation unleashed on their culture, society, and identity. 17
Applying his own definition of genocide to the Nazi practices during World War II,
Lemkin concluded that genocide had occurred

13

Raphael Lemkin was born in the early I900s in eastern Poland, working in Poland "as a lawyer, prosecutor and
university teacher." WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (2000). In I939, he fled Poland,
escaping the Jewish persecution, eventually settling in the United States. Id By that time, he was renowned as an
international criminailaw scholar, and taught at universities across the U.S. ld In I943, he published his seminal
book Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, consolidating and expounding upon the legal theories behind genocide and
exhaustively analyzing Nazi policies and practices within Germany and the occupied territories in light of
international criminal law. Jd at 26-27.
14
Lemkin, supra note 3, at xi; Anayiostos, supra note 1, at I 00.
15
Anayiotos, supra note I, at 99; see Lemkin, supra note 3.
16
Lemkin, supra note 3, at 79.
17
Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except
when accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a
coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of life of national
groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves.

Id
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through a synchronized attack on different aspects of life of the
captive peoples: in the political field (by destroying institutions of
self-government and imposing a German pattern of administration,
and through colonization by Germans); the social field (by
disrupting the social cohesion of the nation involved and killing or
removing elements such as the intelligentsia, which provide
spiritual leaderships-according to Hitler's statement in Mein
.l(ampf, "the greatest of spirits can be liquidated if its bearer is
beaten to death with a rubber truncheon"); in the cultural field (by
prohibiting or destroying cultural institutions and cultural
activities; by substituting vocational education for education in the
liberal arts, in order to prevent humanistic thinking, which the
occupant considers dangerous because it promotes national
thinking); in the economic field (by shifting the wealth to Germans
and by prohibiting the exercise of trades and occupations by people
who do not promote Germanism "without reservations"); in the
biological field (by a policy of depopulation and by promoting
procreation by Germa..'ls in the occupied countries); in the field of
physical existence (by introducing a starvation rationing system for
non-Germans and by mass killings, mainly of Jews, Poles,
Slovenes, and Russians); in the religious field (by interfering with
the activities of the Church, which in many countries provides not
only spiritual but also national leadership); in the field of morality
(by attempts to create an atmosphere of moral debasement through
promoting pornographic publications and motion pictures, and the
excessive consumption of alcohol). 18
The literal translation of genocide is "the killing of a race," and of course the most
expeditious and easiest way to achieve the physical obliteration of the very existence, the very
foundation, of a particular group of people is by destroying the people themselves. 19 That is not
to say, however, that culture genocide doesn't happen, and hasn't happened, independent of
physical violence. 20 It is far more frequently the case, however, that cultural destruction and
obliteration occurs within the context of an armed conflict, blurring the lines between culture,
identity, and regular violence and extermination. Darfur is one such compelling example. When
courts and tribunals prosecute the physical genocide, the cultural genocide is subsumed within it,

18

Lemkin, supra note 3, at xi-xii.
Anayiotos, supra note 1, at 100.
2
° Forcible transfer of children is one such example; see infra note 33 for a historical overview.
19
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and is thus punished as well. 21 Yet that cannot sufficiently address the gravity of the hann being
done, as "[t]he living may suffer cultural genocide without death," without being "vindicated by
the prosecution of physical genocide."22
The comparative lack of severity (potentially) of cultural genocide compared to physical
genocide has led to the marginalization of the concept and a lack of appreciation-legal and
societal-for the destructive effect that obliteration of a cultural identity has on its people,
whether or not accompanied by killing?3 While cultural genocide is not a distinct crime under
international law and is not included in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
(ICC), a new feature in the Statute allowing for the legal participation of qualified victims has
the potential to inject a cultural perspective into the proceedings. 24 The concept is still largely
theoretical, but this Comment will argue that cultural genocide deserves to be recognized; it
would therefore behoove the prosecutor and the legal representatives of the victims to pay
special attention to the impact that a more culturally-nuanced approach would have to the
prosecution of genocide and war crimes. This could become particularly important in the trial of
Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir, the only person as yet to be indicted by the ICC on charges
of genocide. 25 More universally, however, establishing a precedent for the inclusion of the
cultural background of a conflict and a mechanism for addressing harms inflicted upon that
culture is imperative because the unfortunate fact is that cultural genocide is likely to occur again
in the future, if the past is any guide; when it does, there need to be ways to address it, directly

and indirectly.
21

Anayiotos, supra note 1, at 124.

22

Jd at 125.

23

See infra Part II.A.1 for discussion on the second justification for excluding cultural genocide from the Genocide
Convention.
24
See Rome Statute ofthe International Criminal Court, art. 68, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.l83/9, 2187 U.N.T.S. 38544
(July 17, 1998).
25
Second Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad AI Bashir (Pre-Trial Chamber I), No. ICC-02/05-01/09-95,
July 12, 2010.
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Part II of this Comment will provide an overview of the evolution of the legal status of
cultural genocide. Part III will discuss of how the innovative victim participation model at the
ICC works and how it can be used to integrate evidence of cultural genocide in proving the
specific intent required for the conviction of the crime of genocide. Part IV will apply the
theoretical principles enumerated in the preceding section to the Omar al-Bashir case, by
analyzing and extrapolating from the pre-trial chamber's initial refusal and the eventual grant of

a warra11t of arrest for al-Bashir for genocide.

II.

The Evolution of Cultural Genocide

Raphael Lemkin's comprehensive definition of genocide-encompassing harm done to
all aspects of human life-provided the ideal starting point for the creation of a legal regime to
identify, defme, and crirninalize genocide. 26 Despite much discussion about, and interpretations
of, cultural genocide during the drafting sessions of the Genocide Convention, and several
attempts to include it in the fmal version, the concept, was nevertheless excluded; since then, the
international legal community has slowly raised the legal status of cultural genocide to its current
role as one means of showing specific intent to commit genocide under the Genocide Convention
and the respective statutes of the international criminal tribunals and court. 27

A.

The Genocide Convention
The atrocities committed by the Nazi regime in Europe during the Second World War so

shocked the conscience of the international community that the states were galvanized into
giving them "a name and a legal defmition" so as to better come to terms with them. 28 The
newly-created United Nations General Assembly (GA) convened in 1946 and passed Resolution
26

Lemkin, supra note 3, at 79.
See infra Part II. C. I.
28
Anayiotos, supra note 1, at 112.

27
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96( 1), which made genocide an international crime, requested member states to pass domestic
legislation punishing and preventing the crime, and instructed the Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) to begin drafting an international convention delineating the crime.29 The committee
of experts selected to review the preliminary document included Raphael Lemkin, and his
influence was clearly visible in the draft, especially the first one. 30
Lemkin's definition of genocide encompassed three primary types of genocide: physical,
biological, and cultura1. 31 Physical genocide was defined as "the tangible annihilation of the
group by killing and maiming its members," and Lemkin provided the examples, from Nazi
policies, of racial discrimination in the distribution or rationing of food, endangering of health,
and mass killings. 32 He defined biological genocide as the "imposi[tion of] measures calculated
to decrease the reproductive capacity of the group," including policies of separation of the sexes
and deportation, involuntary sterilization, and undernourishment of the parents.33

Broadly

defined, cultural genocide encompassed "attacks [beyond] the physical and/or biological
elements of a group ... seek[ing] to eliminate its wider institutions;"34 such an elimination
policy could be accomplished through the prohibition of the use of a local language and schools,
the restriction or ban of artistic, literary, and cultural activities, and the destruction or
confiscation of "national treasures, libraries, archives, musemns, artifacts, and art galleries."35

29

G.A. Res. 96(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/96(1) (Dec. 11, 1946); Nehemiah Robinson, Appendix, The Genocide
Convention: Its Origins and Interpretations, 40 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 315,2 (2007).
30
Robinson, supra note 29, at 3.
31
Lemkin, supra note 3, at xi, 82-90; Anayiotos, supra note 1, at 102.
32
Lemkin, supra note 3, at 87-90; David Nersessian, Rethinking Cultural Genocide Under International Law,
Human Rights Dialogue: Cultural Rights, CARNEGIE COUNCIL (Apr. 22, 2005),
http://www .carnegiecouncil.org/resources/publications/dialogue/2 12/section 1/513 9.html.
33
Lemkin, supra note 3, at 86; Nersessian, supra note 32.
34
Nersessian, supra note 32.
35
Lemkin, supru note 3, at 84; Nersessian, supra note 32.

-7-

These three main forms of genocide also subsumed additional dimensions or "techniques" of
genocide, including "political, social, ... economic, ... religious and moral genocide."36
The provisions on genocide contained in the first draft that Lemkin and his colleagues
reviewed bore a striking resemblance to the trichotomy framework Lemkin had enunciated. 37 It
made each type of genocide a separate crime, defining it and enumerating the actions that would
be punishable under the convention.38 The crime of cultural genocide was defmed as
[d]estroying the specific characteristics of the group by: (a)
forcible transfer of children to another human group; or (b) forced
and systematic exile of individuals representing the culture of a
group; or (c) prohibition of the use of the national language even in
private intercourse; or (d) systematic destruction of books printed
in the national language or of religious works or prohibition of new
publications; or (e) systematic destruction of historical or religious
monuments or their diversion to alien uses, destruction or
dispersion of documents and objects of historical, artistic, or
religious value and of objects used in religious worship? 9
The listing of the specific criminal actions tried to incorporate, as best as possible, the various
facets of destruction of a cultural identity, in some ways going beyond what Lemkin had
envisioned, such as with the inclusion of forcible transfer of children.40
After the first draft was submitted to the United Nations (U.N.) member states, and
ECOSOC had received the states' comments and observations, a new ad hoc committee was
formed to draft a second version of the convention. 41 The resulting draft eliminated the previous
draft's trichotomy by combining physical and biological genocide into a single article; it also
drastically curtailed the definition of cultural genocide, excising all references to acts committed

36

Lemkin, supra note 3, at 87-90; Kurt Mundorff, Other People's Children: A Textual and Contextual
Interpretation of the Genocide Convention, Article 2(e), 50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 61,74 (2009); Nersessian, supra note
32.
37
Compare Lemkin, supra note 3, at xi, 82-90, with First Draft of the Genocide Convention, supra note 4.
38
First Draft of the Genocide Convention, supra note 4.
39
ld at article II(3).
40
See generally Lemkin, supra note 3, at 84-85.
41
Robinson, supra note 29, at 5.
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against people, focusing strictly on the destruction of tangible items. 42 The only exception
pertained to the use of a local or group language. 43 The punishable actions, therefore, included

only the
prohibiti [on of] the use of the language of the group in daily
intercourse or in schools, or the printing and circulation of
publications in the language of the group; [and the] destr[uction] or
preventi[on of] the use of libraries, museums, schools, historical
monuments, places of worship or other cultural institutions and
objects of the group. 44
The final version eventually submitted to the GA for adoption by the states parties-what
then became the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment ofthe Crime ofGenocide45-had
entirely re-worked the breakdown of the types of genocide. The distinctions between physical,
biological, and cultural genocide had been removed, leaving only a list of five specifically
enumerated acts that were to be considered genocide. 46 The only remnant of cultural genocide
was the forcible transfer of children as one of the five acts, the inclusion of which had been
proposed by the Greek delegation and approved. 47

Two final attempts had been made to

42

U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Ad hoc Comm., Second Draft of the Genocide Convention, U.N. Doc E/AC.25.1-28,
art. III (May 10, 1948), available at http://www.preventgenocide.org/law/convention/drafts/.
43
Id at art. III(l).
44

Jd at article III.
The Convention entered into force in January 1951, after the UN General Assembly adopted it on 9 October 1948.
Schabas, sv.pra note 13, at 3; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide [hereinafter
Genocide Convention], G.A. Res. 260A(III), U.N. Doc. AIRES/260(III)A (Dec. 9, 1948).
46
Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing seriously bodily
or mental harm to members ofthe group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions oflife
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to
prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Genocide Convention, supra note 45, at article II.
47
Robinson, supra note 29, at 18. The forcible removal and transfer of children-which destroys culture through the
forced assimilation of the future generation-has a history of occurrence, having occurred in Comwellian England,
in Australia, Canada and the United States in the nineteenth century, in Switzerland against the Roma and in the
Soviet Union against indigenous Siberians, in the twentieth century. Mundorff, supra note 36, at 63-64; Robinson,
supra note 29, at 18. More contemporarily, during the Cold War, Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceaucescu severely
discriminated against and repressed ethnic Hungarians on such a scale as to constitute cultural genocide. Anayiotos,
supra note 1, at 128. Examples of governmental policies employed included: "1. elimination of minority
educational institutions, 2. suppression of minority languages, 3. falsification of historical data and population
45
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reinstate cultural genocide-in one form or another-into the Convention but neither was able to
gamer support, and so both failed. 48 The concept had been exhaustively discussed in all drafting
sessions and the overwhelming majority of the delegates agreed that the concept was best
"addressed elsewhere in the United Nations as a human rights issue."49
The failure to include any substantive reference to cultural genocide did not go unnoticed
by some delegates, and prompted statements of admonition and regret. 50

A Pakistani

. representative lamented the exclusion of cultural genocide, protesting that the focus only on
physical destruction of life was misplaced, because physical genocide is simply the means by
which to achieve the end, namely "[the destruction of the] values and the very soul of a national,
racial or religious group"-or in other words, a culture. 51 Thus, if physical genocide was to be a
crime, so too should cultural genocide. 52

Failure to properly deter crimes against culture,

religions, or language could lead to brazen attacks against them, which would be outside the
scope of international criminal law. 53

1.

Justifications for the Exclusion of Cultural Genocide

Despite such strong arguments in favor of criminalizing cultural genocide, the concept
was left out of the Convention for five reasons. 54 The first was that the concept was simply too
indefinite and vague. 55 While it is true that the concept encompasses a broad spectrum of crimes,
the two definitions promulgated in the drafts of the convention would seem to be evidence that in
statistics, 4. confiscation of cultural archives, 5. obstruction of contact with relatives abroad, and 6. dissolution of
ethnic communities." Jd at 129.
48
Mundorff, supra note 36, at 77. One proposal was by the Soviet Union, which was voted down and the other was
by Venezuela, which later withdrew it. Id
49
Schabas, supra note 13, at 73. For a more in-depth discussion, see Part II.A.1.
50
See generally Anayiostos, supra note 1, at 114-15.
51 !d.
52
ld at 115.
53
54
55

Id
Anayiostos, supra note 1, at 115; Robinson, supra note 23, at 18-19; Sirkin, supra note 10, at 504.
Robinson, supra note 29, at 19.
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fact, the concept can be sufficiently concretely defmed, even if controversially. 56 The second
reason was the comparative lack of severity of the physical harm; the gap between mass murder
and the closure of libraries was just too large. 57 This is an undeniable fact, since human life is
not threatened by the banning of books or use of languages to the same extent as physical
violence. The underpinnings of society, culture, and communities, however, are so threatened
by prohibitions on books and languages, thereby lowering quality of life and weakening identity.
The third reason was that many delegations felt that cultural destruction was best dealt
with in "the sphere of protection of minorities" or human rights law. 58 This justification, while
valid on its face, does not consider that it is not always the majority that oppresses the minority
and that groups of equal strength and population might also wish to eliminate the other's culture
in a fight for dominance and power. Also, it presupposes that cultural genocide-or cultural
destruction-will be easier to articulate in a different area of the law. Relatedly, states felt that
there were valid and legitimate justifications for the implementation of measures domestically to
incorporate and assimilate minorities. 59 Indeed there are such justifiable reasons; the point,
however, of cultural genocide is to protect groups against measures and actions that would go
beyond the realm of the legitimate and into the realm of outright annihilation and destruction.
That is precisely what the concept is designed to safeguard.

The final reason was that

codification of cultural genocide would be best deferred to a separate international convention, to
allow for proper and full development of all its legal nuances. 60 This reason was undoubtedly an
altruistic one, but a "Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Cultural Genocide" has

56

See First draft of the Genocide Convention, supra note 4, at art. I(I1)(3); Second draft of the Genocide
Convention, supra note 42, at art. Ill.
57
Robinson, supra note 29, at 19.
58 Id
59
Sirkin, supra note 10, at 504.
60
Anayiostos, supra note 1, at 115.
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never materialized; as such, the international community missed the perfect opportunity to make
cultural genocide a definite, punishable crime under international law, leaving its status under
international law vague and its potential unrealized.

B.

Subsequent Development of Cultural Rights
Since then, various international treaties and declarations have incorporated references to

cultural rights, mainly as human rights, but none have ever re-articulated the concept of cultural
genocide. 61

For example, the International Bill of Rights-composed of the Universal

Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR), 62 the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), 63 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR) 64-provides that human rights can be classified into five categories: civil, political,
economic, social, and cultural. 65 But of these groups, civil and political rights receive the
greatest legal and scholarly attention; cultural, the least. 66 The biggest exception to this is the
United Nations Economic, Social and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), whose documents
61

Another difference is that many of the rights can be classified as "freedom to" (or positive) rights rather than
"freedom from" (or negative) rights, meaning that peoples are affirmatively allowed to participate and engage in
various cultural activities, as opposed to being granted protection from governmental interference in those activities.
Frank B. Cross, The Error ofPositive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REv. 857, 864 (200 1) (A negative right "is a right to be
free from government, while [a positive right] is a right to command government action."). The Genocide
Convention enshrines "freedom from" rights. See generally Athanasios Yupsanis, The Concept and Categories of
Cultural Rights in International Law-Their Broad Sense and the Relevant Clauses of the International Human
Rights Treaties, 37 SYRACUSE J.lNT'L L. & COM. 207,220-24,233-34 (2010). The distinction is largely irrelevant
for this Comment.
62
"Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffnmed their faith in fundamental human
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women ...." Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. AIRES/217(Ill) (Dec. 10, 1948).
63
"Recognizing that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free human beings
enjoying civil and political freedom and freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created
whereby everyone can enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as his economic, social and cultural rights... -"
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, U.N. Doc. AIRES/2200(XXI) (Mar.
23, 1976).
64
"Recognizing that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free human beings
enjoying freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone can enjoy his
economic, social and cultural rights, as well as his civil and political rights ...." International Covenant in
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, U.N. Doc. AIRES/2200(XXI) {Jan. 3, 1976).
65
Yupsanis, supra note 61, at 207.
66
I d. at 208.
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embrace a broad concept of culture, as a way of life, as a "set of distinctive spiritual, material,
intellectual and emotional features of society or a social group, and ... encompass[ing], in
addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and
beliefs." 67 Nevertheless, the UNESCO definition is not a legal definition; it is not contained in a
document under which cultures may bring suit against their aggressors (whether domestically or
internationally) if their social and cultural cohesion is being encroached upon. 68
The international document that comes closest to protecting against interference with, and
destruction of, culture-the essence of cultural genocide-is the U.N. Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples.

Articles 7 and 8 both grant affirmative rights stemming from the

enjoyment and proliferation of a culture, and protect against ''assimilation or destruction of [that]
culture." 69

This is a progressive step but it suffers from two main drawbacks.

First, the

Declaration was created almost sixty years after the adoption of the Genocide Convention,
meaning that any violations in the nature of those two articles committed during that time are
essentially sheltered from prosecution. 70 Even still, as with the UNESCO declaration, there is no
avenue for international redress. 71

Second, it applies only to the indigenous, leaving out

67

UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, U.N.E.S.C.O. Res. 25/31, Annex I, U.N. Doc. _ _
(Nov. 2, 2001).
68
The principles in the Declaration are enumerations of positive rights. See discussion supra note 47. As they are
much harder to enforce, the Declaration confines itself to stating that "the Member States recommend that the
Director-General take the objectives set forth in this Action Plan into account in the implementation of UNESCO's
programmes and communicate it to institutions of the United Nations system and to other intergovernmental and
non-governmental organizations concerned with a view to enhancing the synergy of actions in favour of cultural
diversity." UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, supra note 67, at Annex II.
69
U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, Annex, art. 7 & 8, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/61/295/Annex (Sept. 13, 2007). "Article 7. 1. Indigenous individuals have the rights to life, physical and
mental integrity, liberty and security of person. 2. Indigenous peoples have the collective right to live in freedom,
peace and security as distinct peoples and shall not be subjected to any act of genocide or any other act of violence,
including forcibly removing children of the group to another group. Article 8. 1. Indigenous peoples and
individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their culture ...." ld
70
MALCOLMN. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 926 (6th ed. 2008) ("In the absence of contrary intention, the treaty
will not operate retroactively so that its provisions will not bind a party as regards any facts, acts or situations prior
to that state's acceptance of the treaty.").
71
The Declaration confmes itself to stating that "the United Nations, its bodies, including the Permanent Forum on
Indigenous Issues, and specialized agencies, including at the country level, and States shall promote respect for and
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minorities. 72 Most other international documents that deal with culture either protect tangible
items or the rights of specific groups. 73

C.

International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia and its Jurisprudence
The next impetus to the international community to potentially address the absence of

cultural genocide from any international treaty or convention was in the early 1990s, as the
United Nations dealt with the aftermath of the wars in Yugoslavia. 74 In order to provide
accountability for the terrible crimes being committed, the U.N. Security Council established the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993.75 The tribunal was
accompanied by-and founded on-a statute by which to prosecute those accused of the crimes
enumerated within it. 76 The statute included provisions for the punishment of grave breaches of
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (article 2); violations of the laws or customs of war (article 3);
genocide (article 4); and crimes against humanity (article 5). 77 In articulating the definition of
genocide, the statute repeats verbatim the iteration contained in the Genocide Convention. 78
Accordingly, it does not include cultural genocide as a punishable crime.
That did not mean, however, that cultural genocide as a concept was legally irrelevant;
the ICTY first encountered the task of determining the legal status of cultural genocide in

full application of the provisions of this Declaration and follow up the effectiveness of this Declaration." ld at art.
42.
72
Yupsanis, supra note 61, at 230. The distinction is important because while the indigenous may be a minority
within a coU11try, "minorit[ies]" are not otherwise legally defmed under international law and are not recognized as a
"people" and therefore are not entitled to such rights as self-determination. Jd at 230-31.
73
Such conventions include the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention; the 2005 UNESCO Convention on
Cultural Diversity; the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child; the 2003 Convention on Migrant Workers; and
the 1981 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Anayiotos, supra note 1,
at 115-19; Yupsanis, supra note 61, at 219.
74
Anayiostos, supra note 1, at 119.
75
76

!d.

Jd at 119-20.
The Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution
808 (1993), Annex, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993).
78
Anayiotos, supra note 1, at 120.
77
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Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstif:. 79 Krstic was charged with genocide, complicity to commit
genocide, extermination as a cnme against humanity, murder as a cnme against humanity,
murder as a violation of the laws of war, and persecution. 80 Krstic had been a commander in the
Bosnian Serb Army whose corps had participated in the attack on the United Nations safe area at
Srebrenica, resulting in the deaths of thousands of Bosnian Muslim men and boys. 81 In its 260page judgment, the trial chamber82 was obliged to assess the meaning of the words "intent to
destroy," proof of which is requisite for a conviction of genocide. 83 After it determined that
specific intent-or dolus specialis-was required for genocide, and not merely a "general
awareness" of the consequences of one's actions, the chamber discussed the "manner in which
the destruction of a group may be implemented." 84 The chamber acknowledged that aside from
physical acts, "one may also conceive of destroying a group through purposeful eradication of its
culture and identity resulting in the eventual extinction of the group as an entity distinct from the
remainder of the community."85
Continuing its analysis, the trial chamber conceded that as Lemkin had originally
conceived, genocide encompassed "all forms of destruction of a group as a distinct social
entity." 86 Such a broad interpretation of the definition resembled what had been incorporated as

79

Id at 121.
Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT~98-33~T, Initial Indictment,~~ 20-30 (Oct. 30, 1998).
81
I d. at~~ 2-12.
82
The ICTY is composed of the following organs: three trial chambers and an appeals chamber, the prosecutor, and
the registry. Report ofthe Secretary-General, supra note 77, at Annex art. 11. The trial chamber is charged with
reviewing the indictments of each accused, confnm or dismiss it, issue "orders and warrants for the arrest, detention,
surrender or transfer" of the accused, conduct the trial, render a judgment, and "impose sentences and penalties on
Eersons convicted of serious violations of international humanitarian law." Id. at art. 19-20,23.
3
Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT~98-33-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber),~~ 569-70 (Aug. 2, 2001). This high
standard of intent is present in the Genocide Convention, the ICTY statute, the statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, and the Rome Statute of the ICC. See Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 6; Genocide
Convention, supra note 45, at art.2; S.C. Res. 955, Annex, art. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); Report of
the Secretary-General, supra note 77, at Annex art. 4.
84
Krstic (trial chamber judgment) at~~ 571, 574.
85
I d. at~ 574.
86
Id at~ 575.
80

a crime against humanity into the Statute of the Nuremberg Tribunal established following
World War II. 87 This was then later subsumed into the ICTY statute (and even later into the
Rome Statute forming the ICC), as persecution under the category of crime against humanity.

88

Nevertheless, and despite other developments in international law, 89 the trial chamber
stayed within the conservative parameters of the language in the statute and limited the definition
of genocide to those physical and biological acts that cause the destruction of a group--those
five specifically enumerated in its statute, as taken from the Genocide Convention. 90 ''Hence, an
enterprise attacking only the cultural or sociological characteristics of a human group in order to
annihilate those elements which give to that group its own identity distinct from the rest of the
community would not fall under the definition of genocide."91

1.

Cultural Genocide as Proof of Specific Intent

The chamber did recognize, however, that very often, physical and biological attacks are
accompanied by destruction of "cultural and religious property and symbols of the targeted
group," in an effort to obliterate all evidence of that group's identity. 92 As such, those types of
acts-if substantiated by the evidence-may well be considered as part of the proof of the
specific intent to destroy (physically) that group. 93 Indeed, that is what the trial chamber did; in

87

ld. At Nuremberg, the United States Military Tribunal had interpreted persecution in the Ulrich Greifelt eta!.
case broadly, to cover extermination of the characteristics of ethnic and national groups. !d. at ~ 575. "The acts,
conduct, plans and enterprises . . . were carried out as part of a systematic progra111 of genocide, aimed at the
destruction of foreign nations and ethnic groups, in part by murderous extermination, and in part by elimination and
suppression of national characteristics." Jd. (quoting U.S.A. v. Ulrich Greifelt et al., TRIALs OF WAR CRIMINALS,
VOL. XIV (1948)).
88
Krstic (trial chamber judgment) at~ 575.
89
Such developments include a U.N. General Assembly resolution and a decision by the German Federal
Constitutional Court. ld at~~ 578-79. A judicial opinion by a domestic court is not generally considered as a
source of international law. See generally Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, U.N. Charter Annex.
9
° Krstic (trial chamber judgment) at~ 580.
91 ld.
92 ld.
93 ld
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fmding Krstic guilty of genocide, it considered as evidence of the requisite specific intent ''the
deliberate destruction of mosques and houses belonging to" the Bosnian Muslims. 94
The Appeal Chamber's Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen supported the proposition the
trial chamber enumerated in its judgment against Krstic-that evidence of cultural genocide or
destruction can be used to supplement a fmding of specific intent. 95 In his partial dissenting
opinion appended to the chamber's judgment of the Krstic case, Judge Shahabuddeen articulated
a more nuanced version of cultural genocide. 96 He recognized that cultural genocide was
intentionally left out of the Genocide Convention, but stated that
if those characteristics [-{)ften intangible-that 'bind ... together
a collection of people as a social unit'] have been destroyed in
pursuance of the intent with which a listed act of a physical or
biological nature was done, it is not convincing to say that the
destruction, though effectively obliterating the group, is not
genocide because the obliteration was not physical or biological. 97
The crime of genocide "is a crime against human groups," "not a crime against individuals."98
As such, if acts taken to destroy the tangible and intangible characteristics of such a human
group effectively lead to its destruction, it should be no defense against a charge of genocide that
the specific acts committed were not those specifically listed as physical or biological in the
ICTY Statute or the Genocide Convention. 99 The genocidal intent must always be to destroy the
group; but evidence of such intent should not be-and historically is not-limited to physical or

Id
Krstic' s conviction of genocide was replaced by a conviction of aiding and abetting the commission of genocide,
based on a fmding by the Appeals Chamber of a lack of specific intent, but the legal principles enumerated by the
trial chamber as regards evidence of cultural destruction as one indication of such intent remained unchanged.
Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment (Appeals Chamber),~~ 2506, 134, 144 (Apr. 19, 2004).
96
Jd (partial dissenting opinion of Judge Shahahbuddeen); William A. Schabas, Genocide Law in a Time of
Transition: Recent Developments in the Law of Genocide, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 161, 171-72 (2008).
97
Jd at~ 50 (partial dissenting opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen).
98 Id
99 Jd
94
95

-17-

biological acts.

100

Therefore, acts of cultural destruction should be weighted as heavily the

physical and biological ones in determining, as well as constituting, genocide.
ICTY

chambers

adjudicating

other

genocide

cases

have

interpreted

Judge

Shahabuddeen's dissent to support an expansion of the deflnition of genocide in the grey areas,
where ethnic hatred-and resulting cultural crimes-is rampant but there is little evidence that
actual physical destruction of the people was intended. 101 "The destruction of the culture may
serve evidentially to confirm an intent, to be gathered from other circumstances, to destroy the
group, as such," without any manifestation of physical violence. 102
The trial chamber in Prosecutor v. Blagojevic adopted the dichotomy between requiring
the criminal acts to be physical or biological, but allowing the intent to take other forms
enumerated by Judge Shahabuddeen. 103 The chamber recognized, as Judge Shahabuddeen had
made clear, that while the ''listed acts of genocide" must be physical or biological in nature, "the
same is not required for the intent." 104 The intent need not be limited to inferences from physical
and biological acts; cultural acts may be considered, since a group whose destruction is intended
"is comprised [not only] of its individuals, but also of its history, traditions, the relationship
between its members, the relationship -vvith other groups, [and] the relationship -vvith the land." 105
Accordingly, the Blagojevich court recognized that forcible transfer (exceeding "mere
displacement") can be genocide if "the consequence is dissolution of the group." 106 Forced

ld at~ 51.
Schabas, supra note 96, at 172.
102
Krstic (Appeals chamber judgment, partial dissenting opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen) at~ 53.
103
Prosecutor v. Blagojevic, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment,~ 659 (Jan. 17, 2005). Blagojevic was charged with
complicity in genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of the laws or customs of war. Prosecutor v.
Blagojevich, Case No. IT-02-53-PT, Initial Joinder Indictment (Jan. 22, 2002). He was in command of one of the
brigades in charge of securing the "safe area" of Srebrenica, "and directly participated in the actual capture" of the
area and resulting executions. Jd at~ 1.
104
Blagojevic Gudgment) at~ 659.
105
Id at~ 666.
106
Jd at~ 660.
100

101
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migration of civilians and large-scale deportation would also fall under the same category. 107
Rape and other acts of sexual violence, as acknowledged by the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR), are also evidence used to show intent to destroy. 108
The chamber also looked favorably upon a decision by the Federal Constitutional Court
of Germany, 109 which "found that [expanding the interpretation of Germany's statutory
definition of genocide beyond physical and biological extermination] would not be in violation
of international law and 'that it has generally been accepted that the limit of the meaning of the
text has been exceeded only when the intention to destroy relates solely to a group's cultural
identity,"' that is, cultural genocide. 110 While the ICTY in its jurisprudence has not extended the
statutory interpretation of genocide to cultural genocide, the premise behind such an expansion
was further expounded in Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, 111 as it dissected some of the philosophy
behind the actus reus/mens rea dichotomy:
It is not accurate to speak of 'the group' as being amenable to
physical or biological destruction. Its members are, of course,
physical or biological beings, but the bonds among its members, as
well as such aspects of the group as its members' culture and
beliefs, are neither physical nor biological. Hence [under] the
Genocide Convention's 'intent to destroy' the group cannot
sensibly be regarded as reducible to an intent to destroy the group
physically or biologically.... 112

ld at~ 663.
ld at~ 662.
109
Prosecutor v. Nikola Jorgic, Judgement, Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 1290/00 (Dec. 12, 2000).
110
Blagojevich Gudgment) at ~ 664 (emphasis added). The German court upheld an interpretation of "destroy" to
mean "the destruction of ~the group as a social unit in its specificity, uniqueness and feeling of belonging [and that]
the biological-physical destruction of the group is not required.'" Jd
111
Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Judgment~ 854 (Sept. 27, 2006). Krajisnik was charged with
genocide, crimes against humanity, violations of the laws and customs of war, and grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions. Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Amended Indictment (Mar. 21, 2000). With the goal
of freeing Bosnia from unwanted Serbs, Krajisnik engaged in ~~e creation of impossible conditions of life,
involving persecution and terror tactics; ... deportation of those who were reluctant to leave; and the liquidation of
others." ld at~ 6.
112
Krajisnik Gudgmcnt) nt ~ 854 n.l701.
107

108
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Nevertheless, the court declined to extend genocide beyond the physical and biological acts
listed in the ICTY Statute. 113

2.

Additional Cultural Provisions in the ICTY Statute

Aside from article 4 of the ICTY statute which deals with genocide, articles 2 and 3-on
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and violations of the laws of war, respectivelyallow for the prosecution of crimes against property, potentially encompassing cultural property,
including: "extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly" from article 2(d); "wanton destruction of
cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity" from article 3(b);
"seizure of, destruction or willful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion, charity and
education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and works of art and science" from article
3(d); and fmally "plunder of public or private property" from article 3(e). 114
But none of these four provisions provides for any kind of protection against destruction
of culture through means other than the destruction of tangible objects. Yet culture, as the
cumulative sense of identity that is built through both its embodiment in physical objects, as well
as intangible ephemera, can be threatened through other means.

There is no comparable

criminalization of acts such as the prohibition of the use of local and native languages and
forcible displacement. 115

113

See generally id at, 854, as a general statement of the legal use of other types of proof of intent, including, for
example the transfer of chlldren, severing of bonds among group members, and deliberate forcible transfer.
114
Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 77, at Annex.
115
Deportation is made criminal as a breach of the Geneva Conventions under article 2(g)-''unlawful deportation
or transfer or unlawful confmement of a civilian-and as a crime against humanity under article 5(d)"deportation." ld
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Such types of activities are also legally considered to be components of the concept of
ethnic cleansing. 116 One part of the problem with such a characterization is that there is no
formal legal definition, although a U.N. Commission of Experts (investigating the atrocities in
Yugoslavia) defmed it as a "purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to
remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or
religious group from certain geographic areas .... This purpose appears to be the occupation of
territory to the exclusion of the purged group or groups." 117
The second part of the problem is that under the development of international tribunals'
jurisprudence, ethnic cleansing is recognized neither as a stand-alone genocidal policy nor as a
crime unto itself. 118

Interpretation of the word "to destroy" in the definition of genocide

"excludes" cultural genocide because destruction of a culture does not physically destroy the
victims; by extension, ethnic cleansing, which also does not destroy the people-at least, that is
not the main intent, which is displacement-is equally precluded from falling under the crime of
genocide. 119 Ethnic cleansing has only been acknowledged as evidence of genocidal intent (like
cultural genocide), meaning that barring the additional commission of an enumerated crime in
the Genocide Convention (or ICTY Statute or Rome Statute), a state policy of ethnic cleansing is
not genocide. 120 In the same vein, the acts committed under a policy of ethnic cleansing are not
punishable as one coherent crime; rather, each act is prosecuted on an individual basis either as a
war crime or crime against humanity under the various provisions of the international criminal

116

Sirkin, supra note 10, at 500.
Rep. of the U.N. Comm'n of Experts Established Pursuant to S.C. Res. 780 (1992), §III, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674
(May 27, 1994), available at http://www.his.com/~twarrick/commxyul.htm.
118
See Sirkin, supra note 10, at 489-91.
119
Jd at 502.
120
Jd at 500, 506.
117
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statutes. 121 This is all notwithstanding the fact that the U.N. GA passed a resolution back in 1992
making ethnic cleansing a form of genocide. 122
In its jurisprudence, the ICTY helped to resurrect what seemed to be the legally moribund
concept of cultural genocide. 123 It essentially carved a niche for it; while restricting the acts that
could be considered genocide to the five enumerated in its statute, it developed the manner in
which the specific intent behind genocide could be proved to include other physical and cultural
acts and motivations not explicitly stated in the statute. 124

D.

The International Criminal Court
The 1990s thus saw a huge "dynamism" in, or development of, international criminal

law, due to the jurisprudence produced by the international criminal tribunals established to
adjudicate the crimes committed during the wars in Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 125 These events
also led to a newfound recognition of a need to create a permanent international institution
through which to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes-the creation of which had been
stalled for the previous fifty years, despite numerous inclinations to act upon it. 126 Finally doing
so, the U.N. GA convened the Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment
of an International Criminal Court, in Rome, Italy in June 1998. 127

121

Jd at 500 ("International courts and tribunals commonly criminalize ethnic cleansing under the crime of
deportation or forcible transfer or the crime of persecution-both crimes against humanity.").
122
Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 11578-79 (Aug. 2, 2001); G.A. Res.
47/121, U.N. Doc. AG/RES/47/121 (Dec. 18, 1992). GA resolutions are not law; they are only evidence ofwhatthe
international community believes is law. S~aw, supra note 70, at 88. The only way international tribunals may get
around the strict parameters of their statutes is by fmding, for example, that cultural genocide or ethnic cleansing has
become criminalized under customary international law by showing widespread conformance of state practice and
opinio juris, or belief by the states that it is law. See generally id at 76-89.
123
See supra Part II. C.
124
See generally Krstic (trial chamber judgment), Case No. IT-98-33-T.
125
Schabas, supra note 96, at 162.
126
For example, in 1989, the prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago suggested that the international illegal drug
trade be dealt with by the establishment of a permanent international tribunal. See Schabas, supra note 13, at 90.
127
Sonali B. Shah, The Oversight of the Last Great International institution of the Twentieth Century: The
International Criminal Court's Definition of Genocide, 16 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 351, 372 (2002).
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One of the issues that needed to be addressed was whether the statute of this new courtcalled the Rome Statute-would adopt verbatim the definition of genocide contained in the
Genocide Convention or whether the defmition would be expanded to incorporate the newlyemerging jurisprudence and analysis from the criminal tribunals. 128 Rather than engage in the
same divisive debates over the expansion of the definition that had so plagued the committees
drafting the Genocide Convention, the delegates "resist[ed] the temptation to add new
categories" and decided to use the same language as in the Convention. 129 The only country to
suggest incorporating new components into the definition was Cuba, and its proposal received
little support. 130 Thus the international community had an auspicious opportunity on which it
failed to capitalize to remedy the deficiencies in the definition (and prosecution) of genocide by
including the concepts of cultural genocide and ethnic cleansing-even though its motivation
was strategic. The provisions for the punishment of genocide contained in the Rome Statute,
which created the ICC, therefore, are identical to those contained in the Genocide Convention
and the statute for the ICTY-excluding cultural genocide once again. 131
The Rome Statute does, however, take from the ICTY statute its provision on the
illegality of the seizures of, and destruction or damage to, cultural institutions. 132 It incorporates
as a war crime, in the context of both an international and non-international armed conflict,
attacking protected objects. 133 Those objects are "buildings dedicated to religion, education, art,
science or charitable purposes, [and] historical monuments." 134 In addition to this second-best

128

Jd. at 376 n.l36; Schabas, supra note 96101, at 162.
Shah, supra note 127, at 377 (quoting Press Release, Preparatory Committee for Establishment of International
Criminal Court Discusses Defmitions of"Genocide," "Crimes Against Humanity," U.N. Press Release L/2762 (Mar.
26, 1996)).
130
Schabas, supra note 96101, at 162.
131
See Rome Statute, supra note 24, art. 6.
132
See id. at art. 8(2)(b)(ix), 8(2)(e)(iv).
129

133
134

ld.
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option, presumably the ICC will adopt the principle of using cultural destruction as evidence of
the specific intent necessary for genocide once it has reached the point in its jurisprudential
development when it is confronted with a defendant charged with genocide. 135

Sudanese

president Omar al-Basbir is currently the only person thus far that the ICC has indicted for
genocide, but he remains at large. 136
Despite a promising beginning for cultural genocide, incorporation of the concept has
been withheld from international criminal conventions and statutes. 137 It has made piece-meal
appearances in international jurisprudence, but while its exclusion has been bemoaned by some,
it has consistently been relegated to the sidelines. Nevertheless, the ICC birthed a new theory of
legal participation, allowing for victims of the crimes committed by ICC-accused to be
represented before the court. 138 This radical mechanism has the potential to influence the way
cultural destruction is treated in international criminallaw. 139 The ICC will soon face the task of
analyzing its own interpretation of genocide during which time it will undoubtedly rely heavily
on previous interpretations by the ICTY. 140 Until then, or until the Rome Statute is amended by
the states parties 141 to include a separate provision for the prosecution of cultural genocidewhich would be a most welcome and desirable event-there is another, more subtle way by
which cultural considerations should be presented to the court: by the certification of both natural
135

Within international law, there is no hierarchy of courts and so the ICC need not, but may if it so chooses, accept
the rather well-established principle that attacks on, and destruction of, culture may substantiate a fmding of specific
intent. Shaw, supra note 70, at 123, 1116.
136
See, e.g., Sudan's Omar al-Bashir in Malawi: ICC wants answers, BBC NEWS, Oct. 20, 2011,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15384163.
137
See Genocide Convention, supra note 45; Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 77; Rome Statute, supra
note 24.
138
See Rome Statute, supra note 2483, at article 68(3).
139
Gioia Greco, Victims' Rights Overvi~ Under the ICC Legal Framework: A Jurisprudential Analysis, 7 INT'L
CRIM. L. REv. 531, 533 (2007) ("[Victims'] involvement in trials and cooperation in the pursuit of criminal
prosecution advanced ... the application of international criminal law.").
140
Amal Alamuddin, Collection ofEvidence, in PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
235-36 (Karim A.A. Khan et al. ed., 201 0).
141
Amendments may be proposed by any state party to the Statute. ld at art. 121 ("After the expiry of seven years
from the entry into force of this Statute, any State Party may propose amendments thereto.").
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persons and cultural institutions as official victims of the various conflict situations under the
purview of the ICC. The ICC would be well-served by letting the victims carve a niche for
themselves by presenting to the court the cultural context of the conflicts and crimes.

III.

The Novel Approach to Victim Participation

The Rome Statute of the ICC contains a new and revolutionary provision that allows for
victims to participate in a legal capacity-not merely as witnesses or receivers of reparations-in
most stages of the accountability process, from the investigation stage through to the trial
itself. 142 Neither the ICTY nor the sister tribunal set up for Rwanda provide for a similar
participatory-rights scheme. 143 One of the main justifications for this novel institution is that the
overwhelming function of the ICC is truth-finding, and victims, having experienced first-hand
the crimes at issue, are in a good position to accomplish that. 144

Granting them a larger

participatory role also ensures that the ICC will address their concerns-not only for
accountability but also for justice (both communal and individual) and reconciliation. 145 As with
much at the ICC, one of the drawbacks of this scheme is that the jurisprudence assessing and
analyzing the boundaries, scope, and modalities of victim participation is still in development
and therefore quite fluid (as well as vague and contradictory). 146

A.

Modes of Participation
The Rome Statute provides primarily for two avenues of participatory rights: (1) a very

narrow and specific route based on articles 15(3) and 19, that strictly delineates what role victims
142

I d.; Miriam Cohen, Victims' Participation Rights Within the International Criminal Court: A Critical Overview,
37 DENV. J. lNT'L L. & POL'Y 3, 351 (2009).
143
Cohen, supra note 142, at 352. Some civil law systems, however, mainly in Europe, do allow for activie
participation by the victims. I d. at 352 n.11.
144
Id. at 351, 353.
145
I d. at 353.
146
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may play in initiating investigations and challenging jurisdiction and admissibility, 147
respectively; and (2) a much broader (and therefore more ambiguous) route founded on article
68(3) which allows victims to generally participate in "proceedings." 148

1.

Narrow Preliminary Rights

Article 15 allows "victims [to] make representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber" (PTC) 149
when the prosecutor has decided that he has sufficient evidence to request an authorization of an
investigation from the PTC. 150 In that way, the victims may help to support the prosecutor's case
before the chamber, as the chambers makes a determination as to whether "there is a reasonable
basis" that the case "fall[s] within the jurisdiction of the court" and that therefore an
investigation into the alleged crimes would be substantiated. 151

Aside from receiving

authorization from the PTC, the prosecutor "may initiate investigations proprio motu 152 on the
basis of information," information which may be provided by various victims' organizations and
non-governmental organizations, thus "triggering" the investigation. 153

Direct victim

participation may also put some pressure on the prosecutor to begin an investigation even if it is
within the prosecutor's discretion whether to proceed-or at least begin making preliminary
147

The concept of admissibility refers to whether the ICC may hear the case in the first place. The court must
decliile cases that are ''being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry" it out; Hthe case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over
it and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned;" ''the person concerned has already been tried for
conduct which is the subject of the complaint;" and "the case is not of sufficient gravity." Rome Statute, supra note
24, at art. 17(1).
148
Cohen, supra note 142, at 353, 358, 360.
149
The court is composed of: the presidency; the appeals division, the trial division, and the pre-trial division; the
office of the prosecutor; and the registry. Rome Statute, supra note 2483, at art. 34. The pre-trial chambers are
tasked with, inter alia, evaluating the legal and evidentiary requirements-a "reasonable basis"-for initiating an
investigation; take preliminary steps to "ensure the efficiency and integrity of the proceedings" and ''protect the
rights of the defence;" issuing warrants and summonses; protect the privacy and security of victims and witnesses,
preserve evidence, protected those arrested, and protect national securi1y information. Jd at art. 53, 56-58.
150
Id at art. 15(3).
151
ld. at art. 15(4).
152
On one's own initiative. Proprio Motu, Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/proprio+motu
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(last visited Apr. 21, 2012).
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Rome Statute, supra note 2483, at art. 15(1); Elisabeth Baumgartner, Aspects of Victim Participation in the
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inquiries. 154 Having such roles is very important for the victims because they will be able to gain
access to all public information about the conflict at issue from a very early stage in the
proceedings, as well as be able to add to the accumulation of information, which will be to the
benefit of the prosecutor. 155
Article 19 allows for victims who have already engaged with the court in some legal
capacity to raise questions of jurisdiction or admissibility to the PTC. 156 There are two principal
restrictions to this right of participation. The first is that it is only available to those victims who
have "already communicated with the Court in relation to the case," precluding new
participants. 157 The second is that it can only be exercised within a case, and not merely a
situation. 158 This distinction between a situation and a case-extrapolated from the structure of
the Rome Statute-is very important, as it features heavily in the nature of proceedings at the
ICC and often determines the extent of victim participation at a particular stage of a trial. 159 The
difference between a 'situation' and a 'case' is that a situation is defmed by "temporal, territorial
and personal parameters" and is the proceeding by which a determination is made as to "whether
the facts alleged should give rise to a criminal investigation." 160 More colloquially, it is the
investigation into an event, incident, or spate of violence during which time the prosecutor
determines who, if anyone, bears responsibility for international criminal law violations
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committed. 161 The end result is the filing of a request for a warrant of arrest (or summons to
appear) with a pre-trial chamber charging the alleged perpetrators with crimes under the Rome
Statute. 162 A case, on the other hand, refers to the adjudication of "specific incidents ... among
the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court" "with one or more specific suspects occurring
within a situation under investigation," which follows ''the issuance of an arrest warrant or a
summons to appear." 163 In essence, the full spectrum of a trial of an accused, from indictment to
final judgment on the merits.

2.

Broad Rights in a Situation and Case

The broader rights that victims have under the Rome Statute, while seemingly explicit,
are much less straight-forward and are therefore more open to interpretation. 164 There are more
requirements for participation and distinctions exist between who qualifies to participate in a
situation and a case. 165 But the modes of participation are much greater once these qualifications
are met, increasing the role that victims may play.

1.

Statutory Criteria for Participation

Article 68(3), along with Rule 85 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, provide the
participatory framework by which the legal rights of victims are granted for the various
proceedings within a situation and a case. 166

It is this portion of the victim participation

mechanism that is the most fluid, as the pre-trial chambers struggle to articulate a coherent set of
standards and tests for admitting qualified victims and delineating their modes of participation.
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Based on the strict language of Rule 85(a), PTC I, in its first decision regarding victim
participation, enumerated the four requirements a victim must satisfy to gain the legal right to
participate: the victim must be (1) a natural person; (2) who has suffered harm; (3) resulting from
a crime under the jurisdiction of the court; and (4) there must be a causal link between the
alleged crime and the harm. 167
Subsequent decisions by the pre-trial chambers and the appeals chamber have provided
more specific guidelines for these criteria. 168

As regards the first criterion, Single Judge

Kuenyehia in PTC I, overseeing the Darfur situation, determined that a deceased person is not a
"natural person" within the meaning of Rule 85. 169 Therefore victims may only file on behalf of
themselves as natural persons, as well as on behalf of minors, the disabled, and any individual
who has given his or her consent (such a situation usually arises when the person is still in a
conflict zone and is unable to file on his or her own behalf). 170 Regarding the second criterion,
the harm suffered by the person seeking victim status may be material (or economic), physical,
and/or emotional (or psychological). 171 So long as the individual suffered personally, he or she
qualifies, regardless of whether the suffering was direct or indirect. 172
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Decision on the Applications for the Participation of the Proceedings ofVPRS I, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4,
VPRS 5 and VPRS 6 (Pre-Trial Chamber I),~ 79, No. ICC-01104-101-tEN-Corr, Jan. 17, 2006; Rules ofProcedure
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The criteria necessary to qualify as an institutional victim under Rule 85(b) are virtually
identical to those required for individuals, save that the victim must be an organization or
institution, the property of which is "dedicated to religion, education, art or science or charitable
purposes," or is a "historic monument ... , hospital ... or other place ... and object ... for
humanitarian purposes." 173 The only difference-and it is a significant one-is that as regards
the harm criterion, an institution or organization must suffer direct harm; the institution or
organization cannot become a victim through indirect harm. 174 In addition, the .person filing on
behalf of such an institution or organization must submit documents sufficient to establish locus
standi (standing) to act on that institution's behalf. 175 The court will consider any document in

accordance with the domestic law of the country in question for proof of the legal status of the
institution, and of the applicant's own standing within the institution in determining whether to
allow the individual to file on its behalf 176 Thus the requirements for obtaining victim status as
an institution or organization are slightly more onerous than those for an individual, given that
the harm suffered by the property must be direct and that the person who is filing must legally be
able to do so under the laws ofhis or her own country. 177

the jurisdiction of the Court ... give[s] rise to harm suffered by other victims." Id at~ 32. The court gives the
example of the child soldier: the child suffers directly and his parents suffer indirectly; both would qualify as victims
in the ICC (so long as they met the other requirements). !d.
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The provision allowing for institutions and organizations to qualify as victims in order to
be legally represented before the court is heavily under-utilized. 178 What is particularly curious
and useful about the definition that qualifies what kinds of institutions may be granted status is
that the language mirrors, almost precisely, that contained in the article on the war crime of
attacking protected objects. 179 Thus, there is enormous potential for a wide array of cultural
institutions to be able to promote their interests before the court-not just for reparations 180 but
also with regard to their purposeful destruction. To date, however, only two institutions have
availed themselves of this mechanism. In the first, a headmaster filed on behalf of his destroyed
school, in the situation ofthe Democratic Republic of the Congo. 181 His application was granted,
as the court determined that his application met all of the Rule 85(b) requirements and was
properly substantiated by legal documents showing standing. 182 In the second, a priest filed on
behalf of his destroyed church, in the Bemba case in the Central African Republic situation. 183
His application was denied because he had filled out the application form incorrectly-he had
filed on behalf of himself and the institution on the same form-and he had also failed to provide
sufficient documentation of his legal standing. 184
Aside from meeting the objective criteria of a victim, there is one final requirement that
both a human victim and an institutional victim must meet. 185
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proceedings, the "personal interests" of that victim must be affected. 186 The interpretation of this
phrase has caused some controversy. 187 The ICC chambers have interpreted it to require a
reassessment of personal interest for every new proceeding in which a victim wishes to
participate; this is separate and distinct from "the entire proceedings," or the trial itself 188
Obviously, this means that in some types of proceedings-largely procedural-victims' requests
to participate will be denied because the personal interests will be too tenuous. 189 Recent
jurisprudence has in fact established that, contrary to previous decisions by the three pre-trial
chambers, a victim does not have a general procedural status of victim in the situation, or
investigation, phase. 190 This, however, does not preclude victims from petitioning to participate
in each individual proceeding taking place within the investigative phase. 191 But it does require
them to restate their personal interests in the specific proceeding in which they would like to
participate; once they qualify, the victims are not automatically allowed to participate in every
proceeding brought before the chamber in the situation. 192
Participation in a case, on the other hand, is not so rigid. Once the prosecutor files
charges, the chamber reassesses the victims who have already been accepted into the situation
phase to determine whether they fulfill the additional requirement for participation in a case. 193
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That requirement is that there be a "sufficient causal link between the harm they have suffered
and the crimes for which there are reasonable grounds to believe that [the accused] bears
criminal responsibility." 194 For new applications, the prospective victim must meet all of the
objective criteria from Rule 85(a) or (b), allege sufficient personal interest, and establish a
sufficient causal link between the harm and the crimes for which the accused was indicted. 195
Once a person has been granted victim status in a case, that status is permanent for the entire
duration .of the trial, as the trial itself is considered a proceeding. 196 The person need not
resubmit a reassessment of personal interest for each phase or proceeding within the trial.
n.

Participatory Rights

In addition to the more restricted right to participate in the prosecution process such as in
initiating investigations and challenging jurisdiction and admissibility, there are various other
ways by which, and various other proceedings in which, victims may participate. 197 One such
proceeding is the confirmation of charges hearing. 198 Once the accused is brought before the
court, the charges against him must be confirmed so that the trial may begin. 199 In the case

Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga,200 the first before the ICC, the victims' legal representatives
were allowed to give opening and closing statements, although they were limited to making only
ld
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legal observations and not presenting facts or personal statements. 201 The same four Lubanga
victims who participated in the confirmation of charges hearing ·were, during the actual trial
phase, "allowed to present their view in written and oral form with regard to all the procedural
and substantive issues that arose."202
One of the principal decisions203 handed down on victim participation also states that
victims may present and examine evidence; ask appropriate questions whenever the evidence
presented affects their personal interests; access all public (and therefore redacted) information
presented by the prosecution and defense; and "participate in closed and ex parte hearings
depending on the circumstances."204 For those victims who also have legal representationwhether individual or common, court-appointed or chosen-their participatory rights can extend
past procedural ones and include the "questioning of witnesses, experts or the accused."205
Nevertheless, to some extent, victim participation is at the discretion of the court, which
must decide whether such participation is appropriate? 06 A determination of appropriateness
must balance the rights of the accused, including the "right to a fair and expeditious trial" with
the rights of the victims to present their views and concerns when their personal interests are
affected. 207 The court must also make sure that the burden of proof remains with the prosecutor,
that the victims do not become like a second prosecutor? 08 As such, victims should refrain from
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making factual accusations or independent legal conjectures about the evidence that would
disturb the prosecution's case or inhibit the accused's defense? 09
Still, even withln what would seem to be a rather limited or restricted manner of
participation by qualified victims, there is a great deal of potential to influence the outcome of a
proceeding. An astute victim legal team would particularly tailor its representation to highlight
the weaker portions of the prosecutor's case, buttress the prosecutor's evidence with strong
witnesses and evidence of its own, and, depending on the charges, paint for the court a more
nuanced cultural landscape than the prosecution might need to. The success of this mechanism
for victim participation-and apparent recognition of the myriad benefits it brings-is evidenced
by the onslaught of victim applications that swamped the Victims Participation and Reparations ·
Section (VPRS) during the brief window that the court had set in anticipation of the confrrmation
of charges hearing of Callixte Mbarushimana. 210 VPRS strongly requested an extension so that it
might process the 783 applications it had received, of which 530 seemed to be complete? 11
The victim participation framework is a new mechanism in the accountability process at
the ICC, but its innovative

209
21

featur~s

have proved appealing to the international community and

Id at 373.
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many victims have applied for victim status in order to avail themselves of the benefits. 212 The
potential is enormous for victims and their legal representatives to influence at1d enhance the trial
process. Specifically, there are a great many opportunities during the proceedings to inject into
the process a different, more culture-oriented perspective.
Cultural genocide has been somewhat sidelined as a distinct legal concept, even as it has
been acknowledged as one vvay to prove genocidal intent? 13 It has, however, a more versatile
use in highlighting the cultural background against vvhich conflicts can be analyzed; victim
participation at the ICC can help to strengthen this cultural context. It is important to note that
victim participation is not a way to get the crime of cultural genocide back into the Rome Statute
in its own right. Cultural genocide is substantive law which is not presently contained in the
Rome Statute; the victim participation mechanism is one procedure that can substantively affect
the ICC's substantive interpretation of genocide, by infusing culture into the cases. As such,
victim participation can be an extremely useful and crucial instrument in expressing the
foundation of the concept that culture is an undeniable and intertwined part of all proceedings by
reminding the court of past attacks on cultural life, buildings, and artifacts, and the continuing
decimating effects such acts are having on local culture and identity. 214
In this sense, participation by both natural persons and institutions or organizations will
allow for slightly different perspectives to be brought forth, and will reinforce different aspects
of a nation's or group's culture. The legal representatives of the victims would be well-advised
to take advantage of their unique position within the trial proceedings to advance the charge for
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recognition of cultural destruction as a legitimate consequence and oft-desired result of attacks
on individuals, villages, and communities. In the absence of any provisions on cultural genocide
or ethnic cleansing in the Rome Statute-which would require that this type of evidence be
presented-the victims' legal representatives would be able to supplement the prosecutor's case
for other crimes215 and heighten awareness of the cultural context in which the events at issue
occurred.
IV.

Application to the Case against Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir

The victim participation framework, while still fluid, was tested and tried in the first-ever
case before the ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga? 16 Submitted for deliberation in August, in March,
Trial Chamber I issued the ICC's first-ever verdict, fmding Lubanga guilty of "the war crimes of
conscripting and enlisting children under the age of 15 and using them to participate actively in
hostilities."217

The reason why this Comment does not analyze the Lubanga victims'

participation and instead focuses on the case against Sudanese President al-Bashir-and the
reason why the al-Bashir case is significant-is because al-Bashir is the only person so far to
have been indicted for genocide, the crime most sensitive to cultural considerations? 18
A.

Charging Bashir with Genocide
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It is important to note that the prosecutor cannot charge an accused with cultural genocide because it is not
contained in the Rome Statute. See generally Rome Statute, supra note 83. She must therefore be careful about
how to color its genocide allegations-cultural harms can only be used to fortify her case as proof of intent. See
supra Part II.C.l.
216
Greco, supra note 139, at 546.
217
Press Release, Trial Chamber I to Deliberate on the Case Against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-CPI-20110826PR714 (Aug. 26, 2011), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Press+and+Media!Press+Releases/ (page 2,
"26.08.20 11 "). Press Release, ICC First verdict: Thomas Lubanga guilty of conscripting and enlisting children
under the age of 15 and usmg them to participate in hostilities, ICC-CPI-20120314-PR776 (Mar. 14, 2012),
available athttp://www.icc-cpi.int!NR/exeres/A70A5D27-18B4-4294-816F-BE68155242EO.htm.
218
Second Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest (Pre-Trial Chamber I),~~ 23-24, 30-31,39-40,43, No. ICC-02/05-01/09-94, July 12,2010.

-37-

The pre-trial chamber denied the prosecutor's original request for an arrest warrant for alBashir219 on charges of genocide-by killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm, and
deliberately inflicting destructive conditions of life220-on the grounds that, despite the drawing
of various inferences from the presentation of evidence by the prosecutor, a conclusion of
genocidal intent by al-Bashir could not be the only reasonable conclusion drawn. 221

The

chamber reasoned that since there were other plausible conclusions-for example, discrimination
or persecution-there was no specific intent to commit genocide. 222
The prosecutor appealed the PTC's decision not to issue an arrest warrant on charges of
genocide-though the chamber did issue one for various war crimes and crimes against
humanity. 223 The appeals chamber determined that the PTC had applied the incorrect standard
for determining genocidal intent (at least for the arrest warrant stage), and that the proper
standard is that only one of the reasonable conclusions derived from the evidence presented need
be genocidal intent.224 Upon remand, the PTC determined that the inferences from the evidence
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did lead to a reasonable potential conclusion of genocidal intent and issued a second warrant of
arrest for Bashir for charges of genocide by killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm, and
deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction?25
In its analysis of genocide and the intent necessary to warrant charges, the PTC made a

distinction between genocidal intent and what it called persecutory intent (or the intent to
"discriminate on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender, or other
grounds"). 226 Both require dolus specialis, or specific intent, but the objectives of the intention
behind the targeting are different?27 One is the intent to destroy in whole or in part; the other is
intent to discriminate?28

Such a distinction is highlighted in analysis of policies of ethnic

cleansing. 229 Ethnic cleansing does not necessarily result in the destruction of a people; genocide
is not the "automatic consequence" of forcible displacement policies?30 As noted above, ethnic
cleansing by itself is not considered a genocidal policy; it can only be considered as evidence of
genocidal intent. 231

"Genocide, [however,] is an extreme and most inhuman form of

persecution" and ethnic cleansing. 232 This means that it may be the case that a policy of ethnic

2010 (emphasis added). There is a multi-tiered approach within the Rome Statue for the burden of proof to be met
by the prosecutor during various stages of the trial: for the issuance of an arrest warrant, "reasonable grounds to
believe" suffices. Jd at~ 30. This is heightened to ~~substantial grounds to believe" for the confrrmation of charges
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cleansing or persecution escalates into genocide; if the objective elements are met along with the
specific intent, such policies may reach the level of prosecutable genocide?33
Al~Bashir is not charged with the crime against humanity of persecution,234 but elements

of what would be evidence of persecution may be used as evidence of genocide and genocidal
intent because the difference is one of degree. 235 That does not mean, however, that such
evidence would be sufficient on its own.236 On the contrary, it would need to be accompanied by
direct or indirect evidence of, for example, a strategy to "deny and conceal the crimes" being
committed against the targeted groups; official statements and documents referencing or
providing inferences of a genocidal policy, whether already in existence or in formation; and
"the nature and extent of the acts of violence" being committed. 237 Proving al-Bashir's specific
intent to commit genocide, required for a conviction of genocide, is going to be extremely
difficult for the prosecutor, as was evidenced by the PTC's initial rejection of the prosecutor's
request for an arrest warrant on charges of genocide (despite its initial application of the
incorrect standard). 238
In its impugned first decision on the application for the arrest warrant, the PTC pointed to
the International Court of Justice's (ICJ) Decision on Genocide that analyzed whether genocide
had been committed anywhere else outside of Srebrenica during the Yugoslav wars?39 The ICJ
found that despite
the mass killings of tens of thousands of Bosnian Muslim civilians
and prisoners of war; the mass rapes of tens of thousands of
Bosnian Muslim civilian women; the deportation and forcible
Jd at~~ 142, 145.
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235
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236
!d. at~ 145.
237
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238
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displacement of hundreds of thousands of Bosnian Muslim
civilians; the widespread and systematic beatings, torture and
inhumane treatment (malnutrition and poor health conditions) in
dozens of detention camps throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina;
the siege of Bosnian Muslim civilians in cities through Bosnia and
Herzegovina, such as Sarajevo, where shelling, sniping and
starvation by hindering humanitarian aid was a matter of course;
and the destruction of cultural, religious and historical property in
an attempt to wipe out traces of the existence of the BosnianMuslim group from Bosnia and Herzegovina,
such evidence was insufficient to support an inference of genocidal intent by Bosnian-Serb
leadership. 240 The chamber then compared the evidence that had been presented to the ICJ in the
Bosnia genocide case with that which had been presented to the ICC chamber in the Bashlr
genocide case, namely that the Government of Sudan forces had
carried out numerous unlawful attacks, followed by systematic acts
of pillage, on towns and villages, mainly inhabited by civilians
belonging to the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups; subjected
thousands of civilians, belonging primarily to the Fur, Masalit and
Zaghawa groups to acts of murder, as well as acts of
extermination; subjected thousands of civilian women, belonging
primarily to the said groups to acts of rape; subjected hundreds of
thousands of civilians belonging primarily to the said groups to
acts of forcible transfer; and subjected civilians belonging
primarily to the said groups to acts of torture,
and found that while such evidence strongly supported a fmding of the commission of serious
war crimes and crimes against humanity, it could not be extended to a finding of the commission
of genocide (or a fmding ofthe specific intent for genocide)?41
Of the evidence presented by the prosecutor to show genocidal intent, the only reference
to any kind of cultural destruction was the "unlawful arrest of community leaders and [their]
subsequent mistreatment/torture" at the hands of the former members of the Sudanese secret
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police?42 Since the prosecutor is going to be fighting an increasingly uphill battle in proving
genocide as the trial process proceeds, he should use every possible method to bolster his case
for showing specific intent. This includes evidence of ethnic cleansing, persecution and cultural
destruction.

B.

Using Culture to Prove the Specific Intent of Genocide in Darfur
The insertion of a cultural perspective into the future proceedings of the case against

Sudanese President al-Bashir is not only going to be a useful exercise, but also an imperative
one. The media has been hesitant to call the violence occurring in Darfur, raging since 2003, a
genocide. 243 The first high-profile political actor to bra11d Darfur a genocide was then-U.S.
Secretary of State Colin Powell in 2004, who presented to the U.N. and to the U.S. Congress the
fmdings of a U.S. Department of State report?44 Powell's testimony was immediately followed
by an official statement from former President George W. Bush.245 In fact, most countries and
organizations have shied away from labeling the atrocities a genocide, sticking instead to the
lesser designation of crimes against humanity?46 The U.S., as well, later backpedaled on its
statements. 247

1.

242
243

The Spectre of the Holocaust

Jd at~ 178.
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The main reason for such an aversion to the use of the term is the fact that the inspiration
behind the Genocide Convention-and the clearest, most unequivocal example of genocide to
date-was the Holocaust; the 'genocides' occurring in today's world do not and will not look
anything like the Holocaust. 248 Thus because Darfur doesn't look and feel like Europe in the
1940s, it cannot actually be a true or real genocide.249 Such a comparison is absurd and counterproductive-how many people must die and in what manner with how much governmental
documentation before the world calls it genocide? One of the legacies of the Holocaust was the
thousands of laws, orders, and documents (including diary entriesi50 that systematically and in
great detail illustrated the evolution of the Nazi's "gigantic scheme to change, in favor of
Germany, the balance of biological forces between it and the captive nations for many years to
come."251

The Nuremberg Tribunal used this evidence to conclude that the crime against

humanity with which the first set of defendants was charged (under which genocide was
subsumed) "ha[d] been proved in the greatest detail."252
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It is true that in Darfur, there is no "absolutely clear, well-documented intent to

destroy."253 There are "[n]o public proclamations about 'the enemy within,' no extermination
lists."254 "Instead, it is shadowy, informal; the killing takes place offstage. It is the destruction
of a people in a place where it is virtually impossible to distinguish incompetence from
conspiracy.

Is that by design, the sheer evil genius of it all, or just more evidence of a

government's utter haplessness?"255 Thus the fundamental question is whether there can be
genocide -vvhere "there has never been a stable, technocratic regime or a bureaucracy to plan,
execute, and document an orderly mass killing. "256 Or perhaps the more pertinent question
would be, in light of the condemnatory nature of the German official records, whether there will
ever be another genocide with such an obvious paper trail. The answer would seem to be no.
The representatives present during the drafting of the Genocide Convention wanted to include a
requirement for government involvement in the definition of genocide, but did not. 257 Therefore,
while as a general rule the government is usually complicit in the commission of genocide, it is
not beyond the scope of interpretation that the definition could be applied to genocide occurring
without any governmental oversight. 258 Even putting that aside, there will be nary a government
that would risk enacting laws or publishing decrees that would enumerate genocidal policies.
This Comment will assume that for the purposes of the following analysis, genocide can
indeed occur under circumstances where there seems to be little or no coordination with the
government.

Of course, "without documentation produced by a state bureaucracy with a
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genocidal mission, the burden of proving intent is great."259 The PTC acknowledged as much
when it concluded that, inter alia, the paucity of official statements from the Government of
Sudan was insufficient to lead to a conclusion that genocidal intent was the only reasonable
inference drawn from the evidence. 260 It therefore becomes crucial for the cultural context in
which the violence has taken place to be vividly painted for the trial chamber so that the chamber
can make the determination that while Darfur does not bear the same features as the Holocaust, it
could also be a genocide. The legal representatives of the victims are uniquely situated to take
on this important task, as they have the most direct and sustained contact with Darfuris (either on
the ground, as internally-displaced persons (IDPs) or as refugees).

2.

Cultural Life in Darfur

The territory of Darfur-meaning "Land of the Fur"-is in West Sudan and is
approximately the size of France? 61 It is home to anywhere from forty to ninety tribes, who are
primarily identified both internally and externally as either Arab or non-Arab.2 62 The three main
non-Arab tribes, the tribes almost exclusively targeted by Sudanese military forces and the
Janjaweed militia,263 are the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa. 264 They speak Arabic, as it is the lingua

franca of the country, but also maintain their tribal languages, which play very important roles in
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passing down histories, stories, and culture by way of oral tradition. 265 Each tribe also has its
own customs, traditions, and religious beliefs, the hybridization of which creates the overarching,
all-encompassing Darfuri culture? 66 Still, each tribe protects its own personalized part of the
culture, with art forms, dances, and celebrations. 267
The tribal village is traditionally based on kinship and a sense of familial community, as
most of the people living in the village are related to each other.268 Every Darfuri tribe and its
culture is very closely attached to its la.L""'ld, which has sustained it for centuries.269 Each village
has a central meeting area called the dara, where villagers eat meals, socialize, resolve disputes,
and discuss the news. 270 The children of the village are also schooled in the dara, learning their
tribal history, genealogy, and culture from their grandparents, particularly their grandmothers? 71
Special religious scholars also hold sessions for villagers to learn and read the Quran?72 These
scholars, along with the tribal village chief and the traditional healers (whose vocation is passed
down from generation to generation), are the most important members of the community and are
highly respected.

3.

Effect of the Violence on Cultural Life

The widespread atrocities occurring in Darfur have certainly not gone unnoticed and
there is much documentation detailing the violence. 273 One of the most comprehensive reports
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of the violations of international human rights and humanitarian law being committed in Darfur
is contained in the "Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the
Secretary-General" ("Darfur Report"), the compilation of which was authorized by the U.N.
Security Council in Resolution 1564 in September 2004. 274 The Commission requested, and
received, materials from various sources "including Governments, intergovernmental
organizations, various United Nations mechanisms or bodies,
organizations" and "international and regional organizations."275

non-governmental
Most of the information

contained in the reports that flooded the Commission was based on witness interviews, though
some was also gleaned from satellite imagery (to trace destruction of, and attacks on, villages)
and field visits?76
Despite the fact that the Commission did not find sufficient evidence to justify a
conclusion that genocide was being committed,277 there is much to support such a finding once
the cultural nuances are properly taken into account. In reviewing all of the materials sent to the
Commission, it reported "hundreds of incidents ... involving the killing of civilians, massacres,
summary executions, rape and other forms of sexual violence, torture, abduction, looting of
property and livestock, as well as deliberate destruction and torching of villages."278

The

villages are left "burned, completely or partially, with only shells of outer walls of the traditional
circular houses left standing[, with w]ater pumps and wells ... destroyed, implements for food
processing wrecked, [and] trees and crops burned and cut down."279 But it is not just the villages
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and rural areas being attacked-towns and cities are not immune either.280 Many towns "show
signs of damage to homes and essential infrastructure such as hospitals, schools and police
stations."281
Another comprehensive report is "Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic Cleansing by Government
and Militia Forces in Western Sudan," compiled independently by Human Rights Watch (HRW);
the report is the result of a twenty-five day field mission by members ofHRW into Darfur. 282 In
addition to many of the same findings of bombings, mass and summary killings, and rape, HRW
also found "systematic destruction of mosques and the desecration of articles of Islam."283
Government forces and the Janjaweed militia "have killed imams[, second imams, and
muezzins], destroyed mosques and prayer mats, [and] torn up and defecated on Qorans."284
Such arbitrary and disproportionate violence has led to "massive displacement of large
parts of the civilian population within Darfur and to neighboring Chad."285 The severity and
repetition of attacks against the same or surrounding villages often spread fear throughout the
area, leading entire villages to evacuate and flee to more relatively safe areas. 286 At the time that
the Darfur Commission submitted its report to the U.N.-2005-the estimate for refugees and
internally displaced persons (IDPs) numbered around 1.2 million, with over 700 villages
destroyed. 287 Those in the IDP camps do not fare any better, being akin to "virtual prisoners."288
They are ''confined to camps and settlements with inadequate food, shelter and humanitarian
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assistance, at constant risk of further attacks, rape and looting of their remaining possessions."289
The displaced do not want to stay in the camps, yet they fear even more returning to their homes
because of the probability of more attacks, attacks occurring with impunity against the
civilians?90 In addition, members of the Janjaweed sometimes "camp" in the villages they have
burned, thus ensuring that its inhabitants do not return. 291 From these makeshift bases, the
Janjaweed "mount . . . raids across the border into Chad and exert . . . some control over the
movement of displaced persons. Their mere presence close to the border ensure[s] that refugees
in Chad [do] not attempt to cross back into Darfur to salvage buried grain or other
belongings."292
The destruction of entire villages' and communities' ways of life is undeniably having a
profound impact on local tribal culture. HRW concluded in its report that the human rights
violations it witnessed "amount[ed] to a government policy of ~ethnic cleansing' of certain ethnic
groups, namely the Fur and the Masalit, from their areas of residence."293 Ethnic cleansing,
which has a cultural element to it, is also evidence of a genocidal policy. 294 Civilians are being
subjected to "attacks directed against [them], the burning of their villages, the mass killings of
persons under their control, the forced displacement of populations, the destruction of their food
stocks, livelihoods and the looting of their livestock by government and militia forces," the
mistreatment, arrest, imprisonment, and torture of their tribal chiefs, and the violation and
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destruction of their religious buildings and objects?95 These hardships are wrenching the tightly
knit and kinship-based tribes from their land and family members apart. Once they are forced
off their land, these bonds are further eroded at the IDP camps, which are in unenviable
humanitarian condition, and are themselves subject to more attacks. 296 All of these actions have
the cumulative effect of destroying the cultural ties that bind the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa
tribes.

C.

Linking Cultural Destruction to Proving Genocide
Being able to accurately and prominently depict this cultural state of affairs for the trial

chamber at the ICC will have profound consequences for the prosecution of Sudanese President
al-Bashir for genocide. The legal representatives of the victims should seize the opportunity to
increase the role that they play at the ICC-within the modalities of participation that the court
has granted them, of course. This is important to note; there are limitations to the role that
victims can play?97 They can only use the methods of participation that are specified by the
statute and authorized by the court?98 Nevertheless, by complementing the evidence that the
prosecutor will be presenting, the representative of the victims can help to buttress his argument
for genocide, by helping to show two elements of the crime of genocide: the first is whether the
Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa tribes fall under the four enumerated "protected groups;" the second is
whether there was a specific intent to commit genocide. 299
Scholars have thoroughly dealt with the first element, on the status of the three tribes as
protected groups under the Genocide Convention, elsewhere and it will not be re-analyzed
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here. 300 The second, however, has not. The PTC, in denying a warrant of arrest for al-Bashir for
genocide due to lack of specific intent, noted that the documents and official statements that the
prosecutor submitted as evidence of such intent could just as easily be proof of discrimination or
persecution. 301

What will help to support those documents will be a strong showing of

persecution and ethnic cleansing policies pursued by the joint and separate attacks by the
Sudanese military forces and the Janjaweed militia.
In fact, there is such evidence to be found suggesting that the intent of the Government of
Sudan and its proxies, the Janjaweed militia, is to destroy, whether in its entirety or partially, the
non-Arab tribes of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa. 302

The powerful findings of the clear

commission of the crime against humanity of persecution, 303 the crime against humanity of
extermination,304 and the undeniable ethnic cleansing305 taking place (primarily through forced
displacement and forcible transfer) attest to this. Persecution and ethnic cleansing are both
policies on a sliding scale of specific intent, and their coupling provides at least a strong
argument that those policies are genocidal. 306
Of the three types of genocide with which the prosecutor has charged al-Bashirgenocide by killing, genocide by causing serious bodily or mental harm, and genocide by
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deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction307-the
one most amenable to cultural buttressing as fu"1:iculated above is the final one. The shattering of
entire communities and villages forcing displacement into camps, which are not safe from attack
either, is wrenching apart the strong cultural bonds between tribal members and forcing them
from the land they have occupied and claimed for hundreds of years. 308 In addition to atrocious
living conditions, the loss of their support system, cultural histories and genealogies, and
traditional forms of livelihood is straining the identity of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa tribes. 309
As Raphael Lemkin stated in his seminal articulation of genocide, the destruction of the
foundational elements of the life of national groups is the means by which to annihilate the
groups themselves. 310 Accordingly, culture, and the impact that the violence in Darfur is having
on it, vvill play a very important role in the prosecution for genocide. By incorporating numerous
and powerful references to the culture of the tribes and the disastrous consequences of the
attacks, the legal representatives of the victims will be able to help develop modem genocide
jurisprudence, leaving behind the more structured example of the Holocaust,311 and bringing to
justice potentially one of the savviest (or most "hapless"312) perpetrators of genocide the world
has ever seen.

V.

Conclusion

The creation of the Genocide Convention following the horrors of World War II was a
missed opportunity for the international community to criminalize the intentional destruction, ''in
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whole or in part," of a nation's culture and identity-cultural genocide. 313 While the first two
drafts contained strong provisions for the protection of culture and its tangible manifestations,
the final result contained none. 314

Subsequent events in the world, namely the wars in

Yugoslavia and Rwanda, forced the international community to rethink its position on the
complete absence of cultural genocide as a legal concept. The ICTY's jurisprudence carved out
a niche for the use of cultural genocide as one method for contributing to the showing of specific
intent for the conviction of traditional genocide. 315
The establishment of the ICC, a permanent institution dedicated to the pursuance of
accountability and justice of perpetrators of international criminal law violations, briefly
reopened debate about whether to incorporate cultural genocide as a separate crime in its
founding statute. 316 Despite the fact that the international community declined to do so, the
statute does contain a unique and revolutionary provision: it provides for the legal representation
of certified victims before the court, in a capacity comparable to a third party in a case. 317 Some
modes of participation are proscribed for those representatives, but they are nevertheless allowed
to engage in many of the same proceedings, and participate within them, as the prosecution and
the defense. This novel mechanism has the potential to inject cultural recognition and awareness
into the trials, as the representatives will have the closest contact with the victims who
experienced the attacks, and will have as great an interest in securing convictions for genocide as
the prosecutor.
The case against Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir is the perfect test case for the use of
victim participation as a means of getting evidence of cultural genocide in as evidence of
313
314
315
316
317

See Rome Statute, supra note 2483, at art. 5.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.C.l.
See supra Part II.D.
See supra Part III.
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genocidal intent, as contemplated and acknowledged by the ICTY? 18

The attacks and

destruction on tribal villages in Darfur are ripping communities apart and uprooting centuries-old
villages that have strong ties to the land and surrounding area. The killing of civilians, arrest,
and torture of tribal chiefs, and herding of the survivors into camps for the internally-displaced is
only continuing to threaten the tribal identities of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa. 319

The

prosecution is going to have a difficult enough time as it is to prove genocide because of the
dearth of concrete documentary evidence of specific intent to destroy. It ·would behoove the
legal representatives of the victims to take advantage of their unique position within the legal
structure of t~e court to fervently press to the court the cultural context in which the violence is
occurring, and urge that without such a context-and because the events in Darfur do not
resemble what is considered the epitome of genocide, the Holocaust320-the genocidal attacks
occurring cannot be properly interpreted and justice cannot be served. 321
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See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part IV.B.2-3.
See supra Part IV .B.l.
See supra Part IV.B.
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